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Spec i a l  f ea t u r e
T he protection of the environment may, finally, havereached the top of China’s political and economicpriorities. Beijing is declaring its readiness to com-
mit itself to the international fight against climate change,
but in what form?
In order to evaluate the role of China in a post-Kyoto ar-
chitecture, it is necessary to analyse the diverse and
sometimes contradictory pressures that are being exerted
on it both nationally and internationally. Some of these
pressures target the pursuit of economic growth as the
first priority (represented by industrial interest groups
and certain ministries at the local and national level):
“energy security takes priority over climate security”((3).
These pressures are, however, being attenuated by a con-
cern expressed ever more strongly by the National Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency, or NEPA, which became
SEPA State Environmental Protection Agency—in
1998, by some researchers at government think tanks—
the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), the
energy research centre affiliated to the National Develop-
ment and Reform Commission (NDRC)—, by the envi-
ronmental non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and
the media. Finally, the efforts of the international com-
munity and of the international scientific communities are
playing their part in advancing the environmental cause in
China.
It is the power relationship between these different pressure
groups that will, ultimately, determine the policies enunci-
ated in Beijing. The question that has to be asked is thus the
following: will China be able to translate its rhetorical prior-
ities into concrete measures at the national level? On the in-
ternational level, how does it see its role in a post-Kyoto
order?
To assess these problems requires a more in-depth analysis
of the origins of environmental policy in China and of the
obstacles to its application, something which underlines the
great difficulty that Beijing has in implementing its priorities.
First of all, the weakness of the government actors charged
with the environmental issue leaves them struggling to com-
pete against the industrial interests. Second, as implementa-
tion of environmental policies is conducted primarily through
political campaigns a practice strongly anchored in the tra-
dition of environmental management((4) —and by means of
administrative tools, it remains largely inadequate in getting
local and industrial actors on board. Moreover, the frame-
work convention on climate change necessitates adaptation
of national legislation and the establishment of administra-
tive mechanisms capable of achieving the objectives set, and
its application depends to a large extent on internal
processes of responsibility and reporting.
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The questions of climate change and environmental protection are now a clear component of Beijing’s official
rhetoric. Already taken into account in the Tenth Five-Year Plan (2000-2005) with few concrete results, the reduction
of greenhouse gas emissions, energy efficiency and conservation have become some of the leading priorities in the
roadmap set down by the government for 2006-2011. Despite the scientific uncertainties surrounding the question((1),
there is no longer any doubt in China that the country’s exponential economic growth is a major contributor to the
degradation of the natural environment.((2)
Spec i a l  f ea t u r e
Finally, if the external pressures on China have in the past
been effective to a certain extent((5), it is nevertheless still
true to say that any Chinese commitment to an international
architecture remains fundamentally rooted in the belief that
it must, first and foremost, benefit China’s growth objectives,
as Beijing considers that the current environmental situation
is, after all, attributable to the developed world.Pressures  in  favour  o fchange—and resi stance
The evolution of  “green” rhetor ic and pol i-ci es in  China
The “green” debate is not a recent development in China. The
initial primer for “environmental governance((6)” dates back as
far as 1972, the year when, following a series of ecological
calamities in China, premier Zhou Enlai established a leading
group with the aim of protecting the country’s water reserves,
but also in preparation for China’s participation in the first
United Nations conference on human environment (one year
after China’s accession to the UN). Two permanent commit-
tees for the protection of the environment were created under
the aegis of the National People’s Congress and under the
State Council. Despite the existence of these committees as
well as abundant legislation integrated in the constitution of
1982((7), the protection of the environment remained a second-
ary priority, notably as a result of the weakness of the political
and judicial bodies entrusted with its implementation. NEPA,
created in 1988 under the State Council, was charged with the
entirety of the environmental legislation, the drafting of admin-
istrative regulations and national standards, the management of
pollution problems and the co-ordination with the United Na-
tion, but did not enjoy the benefits of a ministerial rank or of
a sufficiently large workforce. Moreover, NEPA often had to
negotiate with more powerful ministries that were promoting
economic development, and had at its disposal few tools to
translate its priorities into real measures, in the absence of a
sufficiently powerful judicial system or market incentives((8).
More fundamentally and in the tradition of the great environ-
mental campaigns in China, if the political campaign is not
launched by the very highest political authorities((9), the envi-
ronmental cause will have little chance of getting anywhere.
Fi rs t  changes
Since the arrival in power of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao,
environmental priorities have prominently featured in the
official rhetoric and have been fully incorporated in the vi-
sion of what constitutes China’s energy insecurity. Several
factors have in fact contributed to placing these questions
at the heart of Beijing’s socio-economic priorities.
The question of the degradation of the natural environ-
ment is tightly linked to Chinese energy consumption
habits: 70% of the primary energy of the country is sup-
plied by coal, while a further 25% is covered by oil. Its en-
ergy consumption structure has propelled China to second
place in the list of worldwide CO2 emitters behind the
United States, but as of 2009, according to the Interna-
tional Energy Agency (IEA), China will sit at the top of
the table of the world’s polluters. Its SO2 emissions in
2006 amounted to 25,944 million tonnes, an increase of
1.8% from the previous year((10), in terms of CO2, the coun-
try has gone from 2,289 billion tonnes of CO2 emitted in
1990 to 3,307 billion tonnes in 2002((11), and 5,6 billion
tonnes in 2006((12).
Arable land in China is in constant decline, water pollution
is reaching alarming proportions and the rare resources
that are available are of poor quality: 70% of the water that
flows into the five major rivers is dangerous for human con-
sumption. Similarly, between 300,000 and 400,000 peo-
ple die every year from respiratory problems, while seven
of the ten most polluted cities in the world can be found in
China((13). The winter of 2006 was the hottest for 50
years((14), following a constant trend over the last few years,
which has led scientists to warn the authorities that a tem-
perature rise on the Qinghai-Tibet plateau would alter the
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quantities of water that flow into the Yangtze and the Yel-
low River((15) as the glaciers continue to melt.
The desertification and the erosion of arable land mean that
sandstorms have become a regular occurrence in the Chi-
nese capital, their effects even reaching Seoul and Tokyo
since 2001. While massive reforestation programmes have
somewhat moderated the rate of deforestation in China, the
area devoted to arable land continues to diminish, something
that is not without consequence for the country’s food secu-
rity. Pollution is said to cost China 8% to 12% of its GDP
in direct losses: agricultural products damaged by acid rain,
medical expenses, aid to victims of ever more frequently oc-
curring natural disasters and costs engendered by the rar-
efaction of resources.
The problem of the degradation of the natural environment
is not restricted to China’s national borders, leading to rising
international pressures for action((16), and China, thanks to its
contribution to pollution, cannot be excluded from any
global arrangement.
The internal pressures in China echo the voices that are
being raised internationally. The different Chinese NGOs
as well as the organisations set up by the government for the
protection of the environment have been among the only
ones to obtain authorisation to work in China. With the cre-
ation of Friends of Nature, the first environmental NGO in
China, in 1994, Beijing opened the door to these kinds of
associations, but the government’s ambiguous attitude to-
wards them makes their activities difficult. Because of that,
the different Chinese NGOs (Friends of Nature, Green
River, Wild China, among others) maintain a delicate and
sometimes tense alliance with the authorities, but avoid
openly defying the policies decided on by the central govern-
ment((17). Nevertheless, the activists are gradually becoming
more critical of the authorities and now have at their dis-
posal an information and support network among the NGOs
and the international media((18). Even if they do not always
obtain the desired results, these activists perform functions
within the environmental protection system that are other-
wise left unfilled by institutional gaps: supervising the execu-
tion of laws and regulations, and education in the field of en-
vironmental protection. They also allow the government to
demonstrate a certain degree of political tolerance((19). The
support of the government for the NGOs thus remains par-
tial: the restrictions imposed on the registration and financ-
ing of and employment at the NGOs have limited their num-
ber and their activities in China, but despite the risks that
they might present for Beijing, they fulfil an important bridg-
ing function, with the particular encouragement of SEPA.
The fourth  generation set s out  a  new envi ronmental  commitment…
A new perspective on energy security, expressed through
the theme of the “conservation-minded society,” (jieyuexing
shehui) has emerged following the accession to power of Hu
Jintao and Wen Jiabao. The two leaders initially introduced
the concept of “scientific development,” which seeks to bal-
ance economic development with its human and natural
costs. Since then, this concept has been elevated to the rank
of a doctrine and relayed to all levels of the state((20). This
new vision of development relies heavily on the development
of technologies, on the energy savings generated by the
transformation of the industrial structure and the reduction
in energy intensity, on the education of the people and on
the intervention of the state in the choice of investments.
The emphasis has thus been placed, first and foremost, on
measures aiming at improving the energy efficiency of the
country, while relying on the gradual modification of its eco-
nomic structure from a manufacturing industry, highly pol-
luting and energy-consuming, to the services industry—and
enhancing the energy-saving measures by raising standards,
replacing old equipment and introducing more efficient tech-
nologies.
Since 2004, the losses in terms of natural resources have
been estimated approximately thanks to the calculation of a
“green GDP” that deducts the environmental costs from the
traditional calculation of GDP((21) and would thus allow local
mindsets, up to now greedy for growth figures, to be
changed. Finally, the Eleventh Five-Year Plan has intro-
duced the very ambitious goal of reducing the country’s en-
ergy intensity by 20% over the period((22).
Several initiatives have also been launched in order to pro-
mote the introduction of renewable energy, to facilitate trade
in carbon emissions rights and the Clean Development
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Mechanism (CDM) established by the Kyoto protocol, for
which 300 projects were reportedly launched by January
2007. In the fight against atmospheric pollution generated
by the use of coal, the NDRC is planning to gradually shut
down small thermal power stations in the country. China re-
lies on these thermal power stations for 82% of its electric-
ity, but the majority of them are inefficient and polluting((23);
furthermore, a large number of them were built without ap-
proval and often in contradiction with the priorities enunci-
ated by the central government. This approach of the
NDRC forms part of a series of initiatives formulated in Jan-
uary 2007 by the central government in order to reduce the
country’s coal consumption by 2010.
At the national level, the fight for environmental protection
has been launched both in rhetoric and in practice. China is
creating funds to finance “green” projects, to encourage re-
search and development of new technologies, to reduce the
emission of pollutants, to progressively organise a trading sys-
tem in emission permits((24) and to help increase the country’s
arable land. Beijing has also strengthened the legal establish-
ment with regulations concerning the use of dangerous ma-
terials by industry and the Renewable Energy Law (2005),
which should allow an increase in the share of renewable en-
ergy in the country’s energy consumption.
… not without  di ff i cult i es 
Despite the efforts to raise awareness, the public campaigns
and the amended laws, China will have trouble reaching the
goals set by the Eleventh Five-Year Plan. The goal of reduc-
ing energy intensity by 20% already seems impossible to
achieve((25), and the central government is finding it difficult
to impose its priorities on all provinces.
It is true that such a radical transformation of the structure
and model of economic growth may well be difficult to im-
plement so fast in China. Beyond the redefinition of priori-
ties, numerous fundamental obstacles prevent progress to
more efficient energy consumption and to the adoption of
energy-saving measures that can be applied on a national
scale, particularly the absence of a legal tradition and mar-
ket mechanisms((26). As long as the price of energy products
remains controlled and maintained artificially low by Bei-
jing, it will be difficult to introduce new sources of energy.
Similarly, environmental legislation in China remains incom-
plete and difficult to apply (as is the case, for example, with
the Renewable Energy Law)((27), few regulations and stan-
dards have been formulated and the current legal body
seems more like a general roadmap than operative laws.
Civil participation, despite the activity of the NGOs, re-
mains limited, and the protection of the environment is per-
ceived as a problem of rich countries, or in the case of
China, of well-off provinces((28). It is nevertheless still true
that the environmental protection initiatives are political and
administrative, favouring a rationale of political campaigns.
Because of that fact, at the local level, the priority of eco-
nomic development at all costs remains de rigueur, even
more so as the cost of non-compliance with environmental
objectives remains very low for the public actors((29).
Finally, even within the leadership, the commitment to envi-
ronmental protection remains nuanced; while environmental
protection and participation in international mechanisms are
priorities for Beijing, their importance should not be overes-
timated. The pursuit of the country’s economic development
cannot be allowed to suffer from it.The ro le  of  external  pressures
Despite the national difficulties in translating the initiatives
into applicable measures, the international community and
the international mechanisms in which China participates
exert a supplementary pressure on the Chinese decision-
makers. Since 1972, when China took part in the first UN
conference on Human Environment, the Chinese leadership
has set up specialist teams within NEPA, the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and the scientific community to represent
China at these international forums and help accommodate
them in national policies. China’s environmental diplomacy
is thus strongly influenced both by these external pressures,
by the internal power relationships within the country, and
by the way in which China sees its place and its role in in-
ternational efforts.
The or ig ins o f  China’s  environmenta ldip lomacy
The timid beginnings of China’s environmental diplomacy
can be traced back to the 1970s with its guarded member-
Spec i a l  f ea t u r e
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ship of a number of environmental forums. It was not, how-
ever, until the 1980s that the commitment became more ac-
tive with the signing of over fifty international environmental
treaties, including more than fifteen conventions and 27 bilat-
eral agreements((30). China has progressively developed close
ties with scientific and political communities throughout the
world. However, in the same way that it has encountered dif-
ficulties in gaining compliance with its national regulations,
the implementation of international initiatives has been par-
tial, as much because of the internal pressures, mentioned
earlier, as because of a preference to limit its commitment to
international environmental mechanisms to the extent that
they risk slowing down the rate of the country’s growth.
China has in fact preferred to maximise the benefits drawn
from the “public good” in question while minimising the con-
straints and limitations that are exerted on the country’s po-
litical choices((31). According to Johnston, if Chinese diplo-
macy favours the pursuit of unilateral interests (judging that
these are often incompatible and irreconcilable with multilat-
eral interests), their pursuit at any price is moderated by the
need to preserve a favourable image of the country. While
Johnston’s analysis remains pertinent today, one nuance
should be introduced, for China is now more familiar with
the multilateral forums and thus less distrustful of them than
was previously the case. There is no longer such a clear dis-
tinction between unilateral (national) and multilateral inter-
ests, the number of international organisations of which the
country is a member has grown, and the experience, in par-
ticular in the World Trade Organisation, has ultimately
proved a positive one, in spite of the apprehensions at the
time of China’s accession((32). It is nevertheless still true that
Chinese participation in these forums, although more active
than in the past, aims first and foremost at preserving its na-
tional interests, such as they are perceived by the leading cir-
cle, and with promoting an image of a responsible country.
While this concern with image guarantees China’s participa-
tion in the multilateral efforts, it does not, however, ensure
that China will take on an active or dominant role in the pro-
motion of interests to which it does not fully adhere. In order
to understand better the limits of any possible role it might
play, it is necessary to examine China’s motivation as well as
the interests that are at stake.
Constant  princip les
From the first negotiations on the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change, Beijing has high-
lighted certain principles, defended more or less virulently
over the years((33), perhaps the most notable of which is the
principle of sovereignty and the right of the country to utilise
its natural resources for its development without outside in-
terference((34). This approach makes it difficult not only to
adopt constraining commitments concerning the methods of
exploiting natural resources and emissions, but, implicitly,
also the work of reporting and of evaluating progress, espe-
cially given that the role of the NGOs, which are supposed
to fulfil this function, is limited.
Secondly, economic growth continues to be a top priority of
the Chinese government. Although Beijing affirms the im-
portance of moderating the natural and human costs of the
current growth mode and rate, China has preferred to let
other international actors contribute more to this public good
so that it can extract the benefits while making a minimal
contribution. This approach is also justified by the decision-
makers with the affirmation that the degradation of the
global environment is primarily due to the industrialised
countries which exploited natural resources extensively dur-
ing their economic development. If the “polluter pays,” it
would thus be up to the developed world to bear the major-
ity of the costs and clearly to take the lead in any commit-
ments undertaken((35). On this point, the Chinese position
has been constant ever since the first negotiations in 1992,
and the American refusal to ratify the Kyoto protocol in
2005 has indeed reinforced it, as it was perceived as a man-
ifestation of the weakness of the West’s commitment.
In terms of image, this position, which has been more exten-
sively adopted by the Group of 77 (G77), allows China to
promote its image as a champion of the developing world.
China in a Post-Kyoto Architecture
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While China is rapidly joining the ranks of polluters, and
should thus bear the cost of that, Chinese diplomacy draws
a distinction between “survival emissions” and “luxury emis-
sions((36).”
In sum, the role of this environmental diplomacy has to date
been to avoid high-cost commitments, in particular any im-
position of emission quotas, targets and ceilings, all the
while providing more signs of greater activity as far as that is
possible. Between 1990 and 1994, China hosted at least
eighteen international conferences on the subject and signed
and ratified all the international agreements on the environ-
ment.
Condit ional  partic ipation
China is indeed active in the international forums on climate
change, all the more so as any arrangement for a post-Kyoto
architecture will inevitably place more constraints on devel-
oping countries. How to reconcile, then, the image of a re-
sponsible country with its hesitation to deliver on concrete
targets for the reduction of emissions?
There is a chance that China’s position will evolve very lit-
tle, particularly on its insistence to see developed countries
bearing the costs. But the American refusal to ratify the
Kyoto protocol will persist as long as there is no firm com-
mitment of the developing nations, and China in particular,
nor any constraint on them. This vicious circle could be in-
terrupted, however, especially with the change of administra-
tion in the United States in 2008. The refusal to ratify the
Kyoto protocol does not represent a fundamental rejection of
the problem of climate change, the United States being a
signatory to the United Nations Climate Convention, which
came into force in 1994, and it is as a signatory of this con-
vention that the United States takes part in the conferences
on Climate Convention and on the Kyoto protocol. How to
reconcile American environmental policy with that of China
should therefore form part of the questions broached in the
strategic dialogue between the two countries. This is not an
impossibility, and the prospect of a jointly elaborated archi-
tecture cannot be ruled out, particularly in a relatively
favourable bilateral political context, and in light of the cre-
ation in July 2005 of the “Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean
Development and Climate” (AP6), announced on 12 Janu-
ary 2006. This partnership brings together Australia and the
United States (neither of whom have ratified the Kyoto pro-
tocol), India, Japan and South Korea. In contrast to the
Kyoto protocol, the partnership does not provide for any
mandatory targets for the reduction of emissions or for any
restrictive application mechanisms; each country is free to
decide its own targets.
Similarly, the turnaround taken by President Bush in his an-
nual address to the US Congress((37) has put the question of
climate change back on the international agenda. Although
the priority advertised by the United States concerns energy
independence, the introduction of new technologies and
clean energy sources (and not a volte-face on Kyoto), this
change of tone has succeeded in producing a new declara-
tion at the G8 summit, in the presence of representatives
from China, India, Brazil, Mexico and South Africa, con-
cerning the creation of a global CO2 emissions market((38).
While this declaration is not in any way restrictive or opera-
tive, it does mark the beginning of negotiations on the archi-
tecture of a future agreement, albeit still allowing for a weak-
ening of the Kyoto protocol framework.
In the same way, China will be reluctant to accept emission
quotas it has so far refused to adhere to them unless the
calculation of the level of emissions were based on a per
capita calculation, given that its per capita emissions are low,
and unless the emission targets were calculated as a function
of future growth and development prospects((39).
The negotiation process promises to be long and complex;
China will perhaps moderate its positions but will be highly
reluctant to abandon its underlying positions, in particular in
view of its image within the G77. The imposition of emis-
sion quotas and any concerted action aimed at changing the
structures and the modes of the Chinese economic system
may become a major point of contention. However, chang-
ing the level of quotas could be acceptable for China, with
a transition from an initial period of non-binding targets to a
higher and more solid commitment in a second phase.
China would, no doubt, like to limit the international agree-
ments to a regime that would facilitate concrete co-operation
as well as funds intended to promote research and develop-
ment in the field of new energy sources and for the introduc-
tion of renewable energy. But in the absence of other alter-
natives, and not wishing to withdraw from the negotiations
on the Kyoto protocol, China would make concessions,
while attempting to reduce these to a minimum. A progres-
sive approach could thus moderate Chinese reticence, on
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condition that the United States also takes part, and that the
new architecture allows a progressive and joint elaboration
of more long-term targets((40). Moreover, if alternatives to
Kyoto that are viable and more beneficial to China exist
(such as the AP6 for example), China could withdraw from
any agreement, judged to be too restrictive.
The question of time remains key, however. In the course of
the three decades that have elapsed since the first UN con-
ference, the tools of environmental policy in China have un-
dergone a considerable evolution in terms of scientific and
legal expertise and know-how, allowing the consolidation of
a regulatory framework, the creation of a community of ex-
perts and exchanges with their foreign counterparts to
deepen. The role of the NGOs, with all the related difficul-
ties, is playing a part in changing mind-sets and in giving
rise, timidly and gradually, to civil participation.
If few concrete results can be foreseen before the change in
the American administration in 2008, it may well be that the
real evolutions in China will have to wait for the advent of
the “fifth generation” of leaders in 2012. At present, the ex-
ternal pressures, as influential as they may be, are still lim-
ited by internal resistance. •
• Translated by Nick Oates
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40. See also Sheila M. Olmstead and Robert N. Stavins, An International Policy Architecture
for the Post-Kyoto Era, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, January 2006.
The study proposes a gradual and evolving architecture that could provide more flexi-
bility. However, one of the principles is the introduction of policy tools made up essen-
tially of market mechanisms, a point that remains difficult to apply in China.
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